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“Calhoun Institutional Archive of the Naval Postgraduate School Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive DSpace Repository Theses and Dissertations 1. Thesis and Dissertation Collection, all items 2...
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NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA THESIS AGAINST THE GRAIN: SAUDI ARABIA AND ISRAEL’S WARMING RELATIONS by Rachel O. Carter September 2021 Thesis Advisor: Afshon P. Ostovar Second ...
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Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for...
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PERFORMING Naval Postgraduate School ORGANIZATION REPORT Monterey, CA 93943-5000 NUMBER 9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND 10. SPONSORING / ADDRESS(ES) MONITORING AGENCY N/A REPORT NUMBER...
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The Arab-Israeli issue of Palestinian self-determination, above all else, has kept these two Middle East states apart and at times in adversarial tension. However, the 21st century has witnessed thawi...
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Saudi Arabia and Israel will continue to cooperate towards mutually beneficial opportunities short of normalization for as long as the strategic context of their relationship endures. 14. SUBJECT TERM...
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LIMITATION OF CLASSIFICATION OF CLASSIFICATION OF THIS | CLASSIFICATION OF | ABSTRACT REPORT PAGE ABSTRACT Unclassified Unclassified Unclassified UU NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89...
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Naval Academy, 2011 Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES (MIDDLE EAST, SOUTH ASIA, SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA) from the NAVAL POSTGRADU...
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This thesis examines how those drivers interact to provide a more holistic understanding of why Saudi Arabia would cooperate with Israel, and the implications of those drivers on U.S. foreign policy i...
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Il. II. TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION .............ccccsssssssscecssssssscccssssscccesssssccccecessssccececessscssecssescsescesesees A. BACKGROUND B. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION Cc. SIGNIFICANCE OF T...
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Saudi Monarchy’s Traditional View of Israel, Support to Palestimian ..............scssssccsscsscesscsccscesscescsssssccesssessesescessescsscesscseooes 17 3. Arab-Israeli Peace Initiatives................
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Fatigue with the Palestinian Cause .............sccscsssssesssssssseseessseee 46 C. U.S. INFLUENCE (OR LACK THEREOBP) .............csccsssssssscsessseseeseeees 46 IV. SCENARIOS THAT PROMOTE OR INHIBIT...
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The United States Withdraws from the Middle East............... 56 8. The United States Fosters Better Relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel .............sscesscccsssssssssccsseeesesssssceccesssss...
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The United States Improves Relations with Iran.................s0000 66 C. MACRO INTERACTION BETWEEN CAUSAL MECHANISM ..........ssscssssssssssssssssssssesssssseseesossssscesessssssssessesssssessesssss...
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My groundbreaking (please note the sarcasm) thoughts are crystal clear in my head, but translating them to paper is not so clear. Brandon carved out time for me to work on this thesis uninterrupted, a...
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I do not know what language the drafts were originally in, but I can assure you they were not in English, and sadly English is the only language I currently speak. You all have my sincerest appreciat...
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However, the 21st century has witnessed thawing relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel. Saudi Arabia has increased cooperation with a country that many of its people and allies view as an enemy of ...
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Immediately following the signing of the 2020 Abraham Accords, media outlets rationalized the normalization agreements through explanations of Arab countries balancing their military power against Ira...
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This thesis will not argue whether or not Saudi and Israel will normalize relations in the future, but instead will look at how Saudi’s increased cooperation and diplomacy with Israel in the 21st cent...
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Analysts then need to clearly articulate that new dynamic to civilian and military decisionmakers to appropriate inform U.S. foreign policy initiatives. Furthermore, shifting dynamics between Saudi Ar...
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LITERATURE REVIEW The literature on Saudi Arabia and Israel’s warming relations during the 21st century focuses on three causal mechanisms: mutual concern with Iran, Saudi’s secular reform initiative...
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However, its official requirement for Palestinian self-determination as a pre-requisite to normalization with Israel endures.4 2 Elie Podeh, “Saudi Arabia and Israel: From Secret to Public Engagemen...
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Abadi also notes that despite failed Arab-Israeli peace negotiations in 2002 and 2009, Saudi Arabia nevertheless maintained close contact with Israel out of concern 5 Jacob Abadi, “Saudi Arabia’s Ra...
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11 Jones and Guzansky, “Israel’s Relations with the Gulf States,” 398-99, 411. 4 for Iran’s growing nuclear program. !2 Abadi, Rynhold, and Yaari further point to the Saudi funding of Israeli intellig...
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Secular Reform Initiatives Saudi Arabia wants to modernize and shed its hyper-conservative reputation. !8 Jones and Guzansky attribute Saudi’s fear of Iran’s revolutionary influence and sensitivity t...
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19 Jones and Guzansky, “Israel’s Relations with the Gulf States,” 406. 5 closer, especially as the uprisings deprived Saudi Arabia of its powerful Egyptian ally.29 Since 2009, Riyadh has openly suppor...
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23 Rynhold and Yaari, “The Quiet Revolution in Saudi-Israeli Relations,” 3-4; Guzansky, “Saudi Arabia and Normalization with Israel,” 2. 24 Guzansky, 4. 25 Guzansky, 2, 4. 26 Guzansky, 2. 27 Rynhold a...
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Influence (or Lack Thereof) The United States and Saudi Arabia maintain a close relationship founded on a 1945 agreement for the United States to protect Saudi Arabia from external attacks in exchang...
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32 Hubbard, MBS: The Rise to Power of Mohammed Bin Salman, 6. 33 Charles Lipson, “American Support for Israel: History, Sources, Limits,” /srael Affairs 2, no. 3-4 (March 1996): 128. https://doi.org/1...
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retrenchment caused Saudi Arabia and Israel to question the reliability of the United States as a long-standing patron.3? While the Trump administration improved relations with Saudi Arabia, it is unc...
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41 Jones and Guzansky, “Israel’s Relations with the Gulf States,” 399. 8 readily understood.”42 Jones and Guzansky surmise that Saudi antipathy towards Israel endures amongst influential Saudis and th...
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These scholars are more optimistic about the question of potential 42 Jones and Guzansky, 399. 43 Jones and Guzansky, 399, 403, 410, 412, 414. 44 Abadi, “Saudi Arabia’s Rapprochement with Israel: The...
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48 Jones and Guzansky, “Israel’s Relations with the Gulf States,” 410-11. 49 Guzansky, 1. 50 Guzansky, 1. 51 Guzansky, 3. 52 Guzansky, 1. 53 Guzansky, 1-2. 54 Jones and Guzansky, “Israel’s Relations w...
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Is the United States failing to protect Saudi Arabia’s security interests and being replaced by a stronger guarantor in a realist self-help world? Does the Arab world believe that we brokered normaliz...
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Whichever path Saudi Arabia ultimately takes, it is likely that its policies will have to carefully balance any relationship with Israel with the potential consequences that improving ties could have ...
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Secondary sources will include books, journal articles, government reports, and non-governmental organization (NGO) reports. Primary sources will include official Saudi, Israeli and U.S. statements, W...
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The third chapter explores the impacts of mutual concern over Iran, Saudi’s secular reform initiatives, and U.S. influence on increased cooperation between Saudi Arabia and Israel. The fourth chapter ...
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This chapter discusses the historical factors that have divided Saudi Arabia and Israel on the Palestinian issue—to include Saudi Arabia’s Wahhabi religious foundation, the Saudi monarchy’s traditiona...
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Saudi Arabia has also allowed for quietist practice of a wide variety of other religions as long as they do not infringe on the superiority and influence of Wahhabism.>> Religion is 55 Hubbard, MBS:...
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Under the first Saudi state, between 1744 and 1818, the House of Saud fervently imposed Wahhabism across the region by destroying the existing mosques, shrines and 56 David Ottoway, Saudi Crown Prin...
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Muhammad Ali’s forces decimated the Saudi-Wahhabi capital at Al-Diriyya in 1818 and reverted the Arabian territories to their pre-Saudi-Wahhabi political and territorial fragmentation. 6! As a result...
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65 Ayoob and Kosebalaban, 59-60; Hubbard, MBS: The Rise to Power of Mohammed Bin Salman, 6. 66 Ayoob and Kosebalaban, Religion and Politics in Saudi Arabia: Wahhabism and the State, 60-61. 15 This end...
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67 Faisal Mukhyat Abu Sulaib, “The Role of Religion in the Politics of Saudi Arabia: The Wahhabi Concept: Ta’at Wali Al-Amr.” Contemporary Arab Affairs 13, no. 3 (2020): 69-70. https://doi.org/10.1525...
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In exchange, the monarchy builds Wahhabi schools, sponsors international Wahhabi missionary work, and tolerates the clergy’s issuance of ultra-conservative social and religious fatwas that strengthen ...
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Instead, the House of Saud’s historical Arabian bigotry against the Jewish people, combined with its growing political pragmatism 72 Alaoudh, “State-Sponsored Fatwas in Saudi Arabia”; Sulaib, “The R...
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One interpretation calls for a spiritual jihad (struggle) against heresy and disbelief, whereas the second interpretation calls for a physical jihad against non-believers, to include the use of extrem...
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The monarchy has leveraged the Wahhabi clergy to endorse, and therefore legitimize both anti-Semitic policies and tolerance towards the Jewish state, depending on the regime’s fluctuating political r...
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Saudi Arabia’s stance against Israel and support to the Palestinians has changed over time as a result of the monarchy’s oscillation between reform initiatives and Wahhabi- backed Arab tradition. Ibn ...
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95 Podeh, “Saudi Arabia and Israel, From Secret to Public Engagement, 1948-2018,” 584; Hubbard, MBS: The Rise to Power of Mohammed Bin Salman, 223. 20 traditional Arab policies against the Jewish peop...
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Then-Saudi Crown Prince Fahd bin Abdulaziz Al Saud’s 1981 peace initiative and then-Crown Prince Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Al Saud’s 2002 Arab Peace Initiative (API) both advocated for the following: Isr...
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Fahd’s plan “[implied] indirect recognition of Israel,” and the Palestinian right of return or the receipt of monetary compensation from Israel. 193 However, as a result of Saudi wanting to improve it...
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MBS’ forefathers based their perceptions and foreign policy towards Israel within the context of the House of Saud’s traditional role as crusaders for 102 Podeh, 571-74. 103 Podeh, 571. 104 Podeh, 5...
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He will not succeed his father as king without the royal family’s fagade of approval, backed by the Wahhabi religious establishment. More importantly, even if he becomes king, his reign will not last ...
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https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2018/1/7/can-mohammed-bin-salman-break-the-saudi- wahhabi-pact 110 Thraheem Abu Mustafa, “What Led to the Most Recent Israel-Palestine Escalation?,” AlJazeera, May ...
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Saudi Arabia’s Enduring Requirement for Palestinian Self- Determination “cc Israel’s delivery of what Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan calls “a Palestinian state within the 1967 border that...
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115 MEE Staff, “Saudi Foreign Minister Says Normalisation with Israel Would Bring ‘Tremendous Benefits,’” Middle East Eye, April 2, 2021, http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/saudi-arabia-israel-foreign-...
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While these drivers have significant potential to motivate Saudi Arabia to forge cooperative ties short of normalization of relations with Israel, they could also whither in effectiveness in the event...
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This has motivated Saudi Arabia to establish a pragmatic and strategic relationship with Israel to counter and deter Iran’s regional hegemonic ambitions. These growing threats from Iran have encourage...
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120 John Chipman and Staff, Jran’s Networks of Influence in the Middle East (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2019), 18. https://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic- dossiers...
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Iran’s revolutionary ideology is antithetical to Saudi’s foreign policy goals of safeguarding the Saudi regime, promoting Wahhabism at home and abroad, and preserving its longstanding relationship wi...
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127 Ostovar, Vanguard of the Imam: Religion, Politics, and Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, 188. 29 dynamic insulates the regime from being overthrown by controlling the distribution of political power an...
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intervention and foreign influence writ large after two decades of perceived oppression by Iran’s U.S.-backed monarchy.!33 This sentiment endures, as was evident in Ayatollah Khamenei’s early May 202...
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132 Ostovar, “The Grand Strategy of Militant Clients,” 27. 133 Ostovar, 10; Morgane Colleau, “Iran’s Janus-Faced U.S. Policy: The Rouhani Administration Between Continuity and Change, Opportunity and ...
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military footprint in the region and its impact on regional partners, as well as Israel’s occupation of Palestinian lands continue the system of domination that inspired Iran’s 1979 Revolution. !36 Pe...
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136 Ostovar, “The Grand Strategy of Militant Clients,” 10-11. 137 Ostovar, Vanguard of the Imam, 10-11, 14. 31 States. 138 Saudi’s concerns compounded over the years as its diplomatic relations with I...
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By leading Muslim allies abroad, Iran projects its own anti-imperialist and pro-Islamic goals that underpin its revolutionary ideology, and establishes foreign allies that are invested in Iranian reg...
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Arabia and Iran, and a shared perception that one country gains influence at the expense of the other. !45 The destabilizing posture of Iran’s exportation of its revolution as a progressive model of...
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146 Chipman and Staff, /ran’s Networks of Influence in the Middle East, 180-81. 147 Chipman and Staff, 180. 148 Ottoway, “Saudi Crown Prince Lambasts His Kingdom’s Wahhabi Establishment.” 149 Chipman ...
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!55 IISS further explains that the traditional definition of the term ‘proxy’ does not apply across the board for Iran’s varying regional partnerships since ‘proxy’ implies Iran’s directive and unifor...
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155 Chipman and Staff, 8. 156 Chipman and Staff, 8. 34 that impact Saudi Arabia, the following primary examples of Iranian-backed third parties demonstrate the Axis’ external threat to Saudi Arabia’s ...
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Enduring regional sectarian tensions and Saudi’s fight against the Houthis—another Iran-backed foreign force—in Yemen position Hezbollah to directly target Saudi infrastructure, as well as train other...
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Iran leverages the Houthis’ deep resentment towards Saudi Arabia and the West to galvanize attacks against Saudi and western infrastructure in the Gulf, and provides the Houthis with funding, training...
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164 Chipman and Staff, 12, 28; Knights and Levitt, “The Evolution of Shi‘a Insurgency in Bahrain.” 165 Chipman and Staff, Jran’s Networks of Influence in the Middle East, 159. 36 Brotherhood—by deepen...
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However, Hezbollah and Iran—who both supported the Syrian regime—minimally punished Hamas by decreasing their funding and support, while allowing for future rapprochement.!79 Saudi continues to public...
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(4) Proxy Group Activity Against Saudi Arabia Viewing the expulsion of United States and Western forces from the region as a means of increasing its regional dominance, Iran has supported militant gr...
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176 Chris Zambelis, “The Kingdom’s Perfect Storm: Sectarian Tension and Terrorism in Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province,” CTC Sentinel, (Combatting Terrorism Center at West Point, Vol. 9, Iss. 4: April 2...
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!79 Iran’s main objective in establishing closer relations with Bahraini Shia was to inflict a retaliatory response against Saudi Arabia and prepare the Bahraini Shia resistance for further uprisings ...
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180 Knights and Levitt, 18. 181 Knights and Levitt, 23. 39 d. Tran’s Nuclear Program Iran’s embryonic nuclear enrichment program has posed a growing, and possibly existential threat to the Saudi regi...
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183 New York Times Editorial Board, “One Way Forward on Iran: A Nuclear-Weapons-Free Persian Gulf,” The New York Times, June 12, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/202 1/06/12/opinion/sunday/iran- nuclear-...
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Saudi’s concerns over an Iranian nuclear program and the two countries have conspired to derail Iran’s nuclear program. !89 Iran’s nuclear program has ramifications for Saudi Arabia and beyond the f...
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!94 Proxy force activity undoubtedly could be deadlier if Iran had additional resources to purchase more advanced weapons systems for its proxy groups. However, the uptick in proxy force activity app...
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Reviving the Iran Nuclear Deal Will Enhance Israel’s Security;” Farnaz Fassihi and Steven Lee Myers, “China, With $400 Billion Iran Deal, Could Deepen Influence in Mideast,” The New York Times, March ...
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!97 In light of the breakdown of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), and Iran’s subsequent decision to reenergize it nuclear enrichment program outside of peaceful purposes, Saudi Ara...
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Volpe, “Abstinence or Tolerance: Managing Nuclear Ambitions in Saudi Arabia,” The Washington Quarterly 41, no. 2 (April 3, 2018): 27, https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2018.1484224. 199 Abadi, “Saudi A...
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Saudi’s water purification and desertification prevention initiatives would also robustly benefit from Israel’s agricultural expertise.2°4 With the second largest economy in the Middle East behind the...
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If MBS is sincerely determined as he said to “coordinate and support the efforts to fight terrorism in all regions and parts 206 Hubbard, MBS: The Rise to Power of Mohammed Bin Salman, 107. 207 Jone...
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213 King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies, “Vision 2030 and Reform in Saudi Arabia: Facts and Figures April 2015-April 2021,” 27-28. 214 Jones and Guzansky, “Israel’s Relations with the ...
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Rob Malley, a senior White House official in the Obama administration who met with MBS on several occasions, remarked that “MBS comes from a generation of Saudi leaders that doesn’t have a visceral, e...
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221 Abadi, “Saudi Arabia’s Rapprochement with Israel: The National Security Imperatives,” 433,442,446; Podeh, “Saudi Arabia and Israel: From Secret to Public Engagement, 1948-2018,” 585. 222 Amer, “Wh...
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administration policy on Saudi.227 Even if the next administration mends any potential bad blood between the United States and Saudi from the Biden administration, an unpredictable and vacillating rel...
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Isn’t Batting for Him Anymore.” 47 THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 48 IV. SCENARIOS THAT PROMOTE OR INHIBIT SAUDI ARABIA’S COOPERATION WITH ISRAEL The previous chapter explained how the main dri...
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CONDITIONS THAT PROMOTE SAUDI ARABIA’S COOPERATION WITH ISRAEL Saudi Arabia’s military and diplomatic cooperation with Israel against Iran, albeit discreet, is furthered by neorealist Kenneth Waltz’ ...
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Lastly, Saudi’s relationship with the Unites States as an partner, mentor, weapons dealer and security guarantor is waning under the current U.S. administration. As the United States distances itself ...
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Neither Saudi Arabia nor Israel benefit from Iran influencing the Palestinian people. Saudi Arabia loses influence as the protector of the 229 Reza Parchizadeh, “The Shiite Crescent: The Middle East...
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Furthermore, during a televised speech in early May 2021 in recognition of Iran’s annual Quds Day—a day of protest on the last Friday of Ramadan to express solidarity with the Sunni Palestinians and o...
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235 The impending renegotiation of the JCPOA agreement complicates Saudi Arabia and Israel’s strategic cooperation, and depending on the renegotiation terms, has the potential to either expand or der...
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At the very least, Saudi Arabia and Israel would both feel less secure as Iran’s security drastically increases with the attainment of a nuclear bomb. It would be far easier for Saudi and Israel to co...
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239 Brown and Brown, “Saudi Arabia’s Religious Reforms Are Touching Nothing but Changing Everything - Islamic Institutions in Arab States.” 53 angered many of the other royals—those who were passed o...
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Economic Cooperation with Israel A mutually beneficial economic partnership between Saudi Arabia and Israel is a solid foundation for creating deep-rooted ties that could accelerate rapprochement bet...
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245 Podeh, “Saudi Arabia and Israel, From Secret to Public Engagement, 1948-2018,” 584. 246 Abadi, “Saudi Arabia’s Rapprochement with Israel: The National Security Imperatives,” 443-44; Rynhold and Ya...
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7. The United States Withdraws from the Middle East U.S. retrenchment from the Middle East could galvanize cooperation between Saudi Arabia and Israel if the other two primary drivers of cooperation—...
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withdraws its support to Saudi’s war in Yemen, and distances itself both politically and militarily with Saudi Arabia, the consequences could be similar to Saudi and Israel’s response to the Obama adm...
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Isn’t Batting for Him Anymore.” 254 Shaun Tandon, “Reframing Mideast, Biden Seems to Signal New Distance from Allies Israel, Saudis,” The Times of Israel, February 6, 2021, https://www.timesofisrael....
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However, progress of any of these variables will undoubtedly impede Saudi and Israel’s existing and future cooperative efforts. 1. Saudi Arabia Pursues a Nuclear Weapon Saudi Arabia considered devel...
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withdrawal from JCPOA, the agreement only stalled Iran’s nuclear program for 15 years.26! Saudi Arabia had already planned to pursue a latent nuclear weapons capacity as part of its longer term nuclea...
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Saudi’s pursuit of a nuclear weapons program would at the very least create an intermission to its cooperative arrangement with Israel as Israel weighs its response options. All other regional dynamic...
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None of the available options to temper Saudi Arabia’s nuclear ambitions are simple or straightforward. However, it is clear that Saudi Arabia’s pursuit of nuclear weapons would radically alter its cu...
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Without alleviating Saudi Arabia and Israel’s concerns over Iran’s nuclear program and Saudi remaining non-nuclear, the strategic context of Saudi Arabia and Israel’s relationship endures.2°? 2. Iran...
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271 Bostock, “Saudi Arabia Is Trying to Patch Things up with Bitter Rivals Iran and Turkey, Showing MBS Knows the U.S. Isn’t Batting for Him Anymore.” 61 Western influence in the region by creating s...
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273 Ali Harb, “Saudi Arabia-Iran Rapprochement: What Is Driving Push for Diplomacy?,” Middle East Eye, May 5, 2021, http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/mohammed-bin-salman-saudi-arabia-iran- rapprocheme...
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Considering that MBS has nurtured an ironclad relationship with his father that allowed him to skip other royals in succession to the throne, buffer himself from royal criticism, and overhaul the Saud...
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Despite increasing authoritarianism within Saudi, MBS has spearheaded “perhaps the most far-reaching alterations” to the Saudi governance system since its founding, so he may in fact be a visionary fo...
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Whether as a solitary move, or coordinated effort with other drivers that inhibit Saudi’s cooperation with Israel, Saudi’s funding of the Palestinian cause against Israel would break down the cooperat...
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actors, making this course of action a wild card. With all other factors constant, U.S. abandonment of Saudi could further push Saudi towards Israel in a realist balance-of-power scramble against Iran...
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“Twin Pillar” policy—heavily relying on security cooperation between Saudi Arabia and Iran to protect U.S. interests in the region—worked in the 1970s, the 1979 Revolution transformed Iran’s entire go...
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MACRO INTERACTION BETWEEN CAUSAL MECHANISMS This chapter explored the conditions in which the main drivers of Saudi cooperation with Israel—mutual concern over Iran, Saudi’s secular reform initiative...
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As MBS’s religious reform initiatives accelerate to promote cooperation with Israel, Iran’s ideological threat increases to both Saudi and Israel. 3. Decreased U.S. influence in the Middle East incre...
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influence on the relationship between Saudi and Israel does not necessarily change. However, the dynamics of how these drivers singularly impact the problem set, overlaid with this macro perspective o...
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The contention emerges from Israel’s policies toward Palestinians and occupation of Palestinian territory, including the holy city of Jerusalem. After decades of exchanging harsh rhetoric and Israel’s...
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This thesis rigorously examined how those factors have interacted during the 21st century for a more holistic understanding of what Saudi Arabia and Israel’s relationship hinges on now and in the futu...
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influence has been on promoting cooperation between Saudi Arabia and Israel over the last two decades, short of normalization. Chapter IV then analyzed hypothetical conditions that would further or in...
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administration, a renegotiation of the Iranian nuclear deal, and recent reconciliatory dialogue between Saudi Arabia and Iran change the conditions under which the three drivers towards Saudi and Isra...
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willingness and ability to project strategic leadership across the region, and more importantly when the United States is unwilling or unable to do so.292 Contrary to their historical animosity, Sau...
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293 Bostock, “Saudi Arabia Is Trying to Patch Things up with Bitter Rivals Iran and Turkey, Showing MBS Knows the U.S. Isn’t Batting for Him Anymore.” 294 Harb, “Saudi Arabia-Iran Rapprochement: What...
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However, this relationship has ebbed and flowed over the course of the last two decades, with a less favorable relationship under the Obama administration, a reinvigorated sense of partnership under t...
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However, that strategic context is challenged by recent changes in the political environment. A. IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY The Middle East endures in its pivotal role in United States foreign pol...
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national security emanating from malign actors in the Middle East do not disappear simply because we have pivoted to a more pressing problem set, such as great power competition. U.S. actions and inac...
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It would be a good news story for Saudi Arabia and Israel to continue their trajectory of cooperation without U.S. influence as a driver, but removing U.S. influence impacts the salience of the other ...
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“Saudi Arabia’s Rapprochement with Israel: The National Security Imperatives.” Middle Eastern Studies 55, no. 3 (May 4, 2019): 433-49. https://doi.org/10.1080/00263206.2018.1509853 Abu Mustafa, Ibrah...
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“State-Sponsored Fatwas in Saudi Arabia.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, n.d. https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/7597 1. Ali, Dr Mohamed Bin. “Al-Wala’ Wal Bara’ in Wahhabism: From A Tool...
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Arms Control Association, “The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) at a Glance,” Arms Control Association, July 2021, https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/JCPOA-at-a-glance. Ayoob, Mohammed, ...
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Reviving the Iran Nuclear Deal Will Enhance Israel’s Security.” Washington Post, May 26, 2021. https://www. washingtonpost.com/opinions/202 1/05/26/gaza-war-isnt-an- argument-against-iran-nuclear-deal...
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Policy: The Rouhani Administration Between Continuity and Change, Opportunity and Constraint.” In Jran in the World: President Rouhani’ s Foreign Policy. Springer, 2016. “Constitution of the Islamic R...
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“Iran Clears Way for Hard-Line Judiciary Chief to Become President.” The New York Times, May 28, 2021. https://www.nytimes.com/202 1/05/28/world/middleeast/iran-election-khamenei- raisi.html Fassihi,...
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“Saudi Crown Prince: Iran’s Supreme Leader ‘Makes Hitler Look Good.’” The Atlantic, April 2, 2018. https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/04/mohammed-bin- salman-iran-israel/557036/. G...
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for Pause in Nuclear Talks.” Reuters, July 28, 2021, sec. Middle East. https://www.reuters.com/world/middle- east/irans-khamenei-blames-cowardly-us-pause-nuclear-talks-202 1 -07-28/. ——. “Tran’s Khame...
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Harkov, Lahav, “Bennett Plans to Continue Netanyahu’s Iran Policies,” The Jerusalem Post, June 13, 2021, https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/bennett-plans-to- continue-netanyahu-iran-policies-670883. Ho...
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“Israel’s Relations with the Gulf States: Toward the Emergence of a Tacit Security Regime?” Contemporary Security Policy 38, no. 3 (September 2, 2017): 398-419. https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2017.1...
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“Vision 2030 and Reform in Saudi Arabia: Facts and Figures April 2015-April 2021.” Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, May 2021. Knights, Michael and Matthew Levitt, “The Evolution of Shi'a Insurgency in Bahrain...
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“Saudi Foreign Minister Says Normalisation with Israel Would Bring ‘Tremendous Benefits.’” Middle East Eye, April 2, 2021. http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/saudi-arabia-israel-foreign-minister- norma...
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“Iran, Its Clients, and the Future of the Middle East: The Limits of Religion.” /nternational Affairs 94, no. 6 (November 1, 2018): 1237-55. https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiy185. ——. “The Grand Strategy ...
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Nuclear Logics: Contrasting Paths in East Asia and the Middle East. Princeton, UNITED STATES: Princeton University Press, 2007. http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ebook-nps/detail.action?docID=44555...
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“Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power.” Jnternational Security 9, no. 4 (1985). Waltz, Kenneth Neal. Theory of International Politics. Long Grove, Ill: Waveland Press, 2010. 80 Xiyue, Wan...
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Belvoir, Virginia Dudley Knox Library Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 83