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Theses and Dissertations 1. Thesis and Dissertation Collection, all items
2...
NAVAL
POSTGRADUATE
SCHOOL
MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA
THESIS
AGAINST THE GRAIN: SAUDI ARABIA AND ISRAEL’S
WARMING RELATIONS
by
Rachel O. Carter
September 2021
Thesis Advisor: Afshon P. Ostovar
Second ...
Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions
for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for...
PERFORMING
Naval Postgraduate School ORGANIZATION REPORT
Monterey, CA 93943-5000 NUMBER
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND 10. SPONSORING /
ADDRESS(ES) MONITORING AGENCY
N/A REPORT NUMBER...
The Arab-Israeli issue of
Palestinian self-determination, above all else, has kept these two Middle East states apart and at times in
adversarial tension. However, the 21st century has witnessed thawi...
Saudi Arabia and Israel will continue to cooperate towards mutually beneficial opportunities short of
normalization for as long as the strategic context of their relationship endures. 14. SUBJECT TERM...
LIMITATION OF
CLASSIFICATION OF CLASSIFICATION OF THIS | CLASSIFICATION OF | ABSTRACT
REPORT PAGE ABSTRACT
Unclassified Unclassified Unclassified UU
NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89...
Naval Academy, 2011
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES
(MIDDLE EAST, SOUTH ASIA, SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA)
from the
NAVAL POSTGRADU...
This thesis examines how those drivers interact to provide a more holistic understanding
of why Saudi Arabia would cooperate with Israel, and the implications of those drivers
on U.S. foreign policy i...
Il. II. TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION .............ccccsssssssscecssssssscccssssscccesssssccccecessssccececessscssecssescsescesesees
A. BACKGROUND
B. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION
Cc. SIGNIFICANCE OF T...
Saudi Monarchy’s Traditional View of Israel, Support to
Palestimian ..............scssssccsscsscesscsccscesscescsssssccesssessesescessescsscesscseooes 17
3. Arab-Israeli Peace Initiatives................
Fatigue with the Palestinian Cause .............sccscsssssesssssssseseessseee 46
C. U.S. INFLUENCE (OR LACK THEREOBP) .............csccsssssssscsessseseeseeees 46 IV. SCENARIOS THAT PROMOTE OR INHIBIT...
The United States Withdraws from the Middle East............... 56
8. The United States Fosters Better Relations between Saudi
Arabia and Israel .............sscesscccsssssssssccsseeesesssssceccesssss...
The United States Improves Relations with Iran.................s0000 66
C. MACRO INTERACTION BETWEEN CAUSAL
MECHANISM ..........ssscssssssssssssssssssssesssssseseesossssscesessssssssessesssssessesssss...
My groundbreaking (please note the sarcasm) thoughts are crystal clear in my
head, but translating them to paper is not so clear. Brandon carved out time for me to work
on this thesis uninterrupted, a...
I do not know
what language the drafts were originally in, but I can assure you they were not in English,
and sadly English is the only language I currently speak. You all have my sincerest
appreciat...
However, the
21st century has witnessed thawing relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel. Saudi
Arabia has increased cooperation with a country that many of its people and allies view as
an enemy of ...
Immediately following the signing of the
2020 Abraham Accords, media outlets rationalized the normalization agreements through
explanations of Arab countries balancing their military power against Ira...
This thesis will not argue whether or not Saudi and Israel will normalize
relations in the future, but instead will look at how Saudi’s increased cooperation and
diplomacy with Israel in the 21st cent...
Analysts then need to clearly articulate that new dynamic
to civilian and military decisionmakers to appropriate inform U.S. foreign policy
initiatives. Furthermore, shifting dynamics between Saudi Ar...
LITERATURE REVIEW
The literature on Saudi Arabia and Israel’s warming relations during the 21st
century focuses on three causal mechanisms: mutual concern with Iran, Saudi’s secular
reform initiative...
However, its official requirement for
Palestinian self-determination as a pre-requisite to normalization with Israel endures.4
2 Elie Podeh, “Saudi Arabia and Israel: From Secret to Public Engagemen...
Abadi also notes that despite failed Arab-Israeli peace negotiations in 2002
and 2009, Saudi Arabia nevertheless maintained close contact with Israel out of concern
5 Jacob Abadi, “Saudi Arabia’s Ra...
11 Jones and Guzansky, “Israel’s Relations with the Gulf States,” 398-99, 411. 4 for Iran’s growing nuclear program. !2 Abadi, Rynhold, and Yaari further point to the Saudi
funding of Israeli intellig...
Secular Reform Initiatives
Saudi Arabia wants to modernize and shed its hyper-conservative reputation. !8
Jones and Guzansky attribute Saudi’s fear of Iran’s revolutionary influence and sensitivity
t...
19 Jones and Guzansky, “Israel’s Relations with the Gulf States,” 406. 5 closer, especially as the uprisings deprived Saudi Arabia of its powerful Egyptian ally.29
Since 2009, Riyadh has openly suppor...
23 Rynhold and Yaari, “The Quiet Revolution in Saudi-Israeli Relations,” 3-4; Guzansky, “Saudi
Arabia and Normalization with Israel,” 2. 24 Guzansky, 4. 25 Guzansky, 2, 4. 26 Guzansky, 2. 27 Rynhold a...
Influence (or Lack Thereof)
The United States and Saudi Arabia maintain a close relationship founded on a
1945 agreement for the United States to protect Saudi Arabia from external attacks in
exchang...
32 Hubbard, MBS: The Rise to Power of Mohammed Bin Salman, 6. 33 Charles Lipson, “American Support for Israel: History, Sources, Limits,” /srael Affairs 2, no. 3-4
(March 1996): 128. https://doi.org/1...
retrenchment caused Saudi Arabia and Israel to question the reliability of the United States
as a long-standing patron.3? While the Trump administration improved relations with Saudi
Arabia, it is unc...
41 Jones and Guzansky, “Israel’s Relations with the Gulf States,” 399. 8 readily understood.”42 Jones and Guzansky surmise that Saudi antipathy towards Israel
endures amongst influential Saudis and th...
These scholars are more optimistic about the question of potential
42 Jones and Guzansky, 399. 43 Jones and Guzansky, 399, 403, 410, 412, 414. 44 Abadi, “Saudi Arabia’s Rapprochement with Israel: The...
48 Jones and Guzansky, “Israel’s Relations with the Gulf States,” 410-11. 49 Guzansky, 1. 50 Guzansky, 1. 51 Guzansky, 3. 52 Guzansky, 1. 53 Guzansky, 1-2. 54 Jones and Guzansky, “Israel’s Relations w...
Is the
United States failing to protect Saudi Arabia’s security interests and being replaced by a
stronger guarantor in a realist self-help world? Does the Arab world believe that we
brokered normaliz...
Whichever path Saudi Arabia ultimately
takes, it is likely that its policies will have to carefully balance any relationship with Israel
with the potential consequences that improving ties could have ...
Secondary sources will include books, journal articles,
government reports, and non-governmental organization (NGO) reports. Primary sources
will include official Saudi, Israeli and U.S. statements, W...
The third chapter explores the impacts of mutual concern over Iran, Saudi’s
secular reform initiatives, and U.S. influence on increased cooperation between Saudi
Arabia and Israel. The fourth chapter ...
This chapter discusses the historical factors that have divided Saudi Arabia and Israel on
the Palestinian issue—to include Saudi Arabia’s Wahhabi religious foundation, the Saudi
monarchy’s traditiona...
Saudi Arabia has also allowed for quietist practice of a wide variety of other religions as
long as they do not infringe on the superiority and influence of Wahhabism.>> Religion is
55 Hubbard, MBS:...
Under the first Saudi state, between 1744 and 1818, the House of Saud fervently
imposed Wahhabism across the region by destroying the existing mosques, shrines and
56 David Ottoway, Saudi Crown Prin...
Muhammad Ali’s forces decimated the Saudi-Wahhabi capital at Al-Diriyya in 1818 and
reverted the Arabian territories to their pre-Saudi-Wahhabi political and territorial
fragmentation. 6! As a result...
65 Ayoob and Kosebalaban, 59-60; Hubbard, MBS: The Rise to Power of Mohammed Bin Salman, 6. 66 Ayoob and Kosebalaban, Religion and Politics in Saudi Arabia: Wahhabism and the State, 60-61. 15 This end...
67 Faisal Mukhyat Abu Sulaib, “The Role of Religion in the Politics of Saudi Arabia: The Wahhabi
Concept: Ta’at Wali Al-Amr.” Contemporary Arab Affairs 13, no. 3 (2020): 69-70. https://doi.org/10.1525...
In exchange, the monarchy builds Wahhabi schools, sponsors international Wahhabi
missionary work, and tolerates the clergy’s issuance of ultra-conservative social and
religious fatwas that strengthen ...
Instead, the House of Saud’s historical
Arabian bigotry against the Jewish people, combined with its growing political pragmatism
72 Alaoudh, “State-Sponsored Fatwas in Saudi Arabia”; Sulaib, “The R...
One interpretation calls for a spiritual jihad (struggle)
against heresy and disbelief, whereas the second interpretation calls for a physical jihad
against non-believers, to include the use of extrem...
The monarchy has leveraged the Wahhabi clergy to
endorse, and therefore legitimize both anti-Semitic policies and tolerance towards the
Jewish state, depending on the regime’s fluctuating political r...
Saudi Arabia’s stance against Israel and support to the Palestinians has changed
over time as a result of the monarchy’s oscillation between reform initiatives and Wahhabi-
backed Arab tradition. Ibn ...
95 Podeh, “Saudi Arabia and Israel, From Secret to Public Engagement, 1948-2018,” 584; Hubbard,
MBS: The Rise to Power of Mohammed Bin Salman, 223. 20 traditional Arab policies against the Jewish peop...
Then-Saudi
Crown Prince Fahd bin Abdulaziz Al Saud’s 1981 peace initiative and then-Crown Prince
Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Al Saud’s 2002 Arab Peace Initiative (API) both advocated for
the following: Isr...
Fahd’s plan “[implied] indirect recognition
of Israel,” and the Palestinian right of return or the receipt of monetary compensation from
Israel. 193 However, as a result of Saudi wanting to improve it...
MBS’ forefathers based their perceptions and foreign policy
towards Israel within the context of the House of Saud’s traditional role as crusaders for
102 Podeh, 571-74. 103 Podeh, 571. 104 Podeh, 5...
He will not succeed his father as king without the
royal family’s fagade of approval, backed by the Wahhabi religious establishment. More
importantly, even if he becomes king, his reign will not last ...
https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2018/1/7/can-mohammed-bin-salman-break-the-saudi-
wahhabi-pact
110 Thraheem Abu Mustafa, “What Led to the Most Recent Israel-Palestine Escalation?,” AlJazeera,
May ...
Saudi Arabia’s Enduring Requirement for Palestinian Self-
Determination
“cc
Israel’s delivery of what Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan calls “a
Palestinian state within the 1967 border that...
115 MEE Staff, “Saudi Foreign Minister Says Normalisation with Israel Would Bring ‘Tremendous
Benefits,’” Middle East Eye, April 2, 2021, http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/saudi-arabia-israel-foreign-...
While these drivers have significant potential to motivate Saudi
Arabia to forge cooperative ties short of normalization of relations with Israel, they could
also whither in effectiveness in the event...
This has motivated Saudi Arabia to establish a pragmatic and
strategic relationship with Israel to counter and deter Iran’s regional hegemonic ambitions. These growing threats from Iran have encourage...
120 John Chipman and Staff, Jran’s Networks of Influence in the Middle East (London: The
International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2019), 18. https://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-
dossiers...
Iran’s revolutionary
ideology is antithetical to Saudi’s foreign policy goals of safeguarding the Saudi regime,
promoting Wahhabism at home and abroad, and preserving its longstanding relationship
wi...
127 Ostovar, Vanguard of the Imam: Religion, Politics, and Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, 188. 29 dynamic insulates the regime from being overthrown by controlling the distribution of
political power an...
intervention and foreign influence writ large after two
decades of perceived oppression by Iran’s U.S.-backed monarchy.!33 This sentiment
endures, as was evident in Ayatollah Khamenei’s early May 202...
132 Ostovar, “The Grand Strategy of Militant Clients,” 27. 133 Ostovar, 10; Morgane Colleau, “Iran’s Janus-Faced U.S. Policy: The Rouhani Administration
Between Continuity and Change, Opportunity and ...
military
footprint in the region and its impact on regional partners, as well as Israel’s occupation of
Palestinian lands continue the system of domination that inspired Iran’s 1979
Revolution. !36 Pe...
136 Ostovar, “The Grand Strategy of Militant Clients,” 10-11. 137 Ostovar, Vanguard of the Imam, 10-11, 14. 31 States. 138 Saudi’s concerns compounded over the years as its diplomatic relations with I...
By
leading Muslim allies abroad, Iran projects its own anti-imperialist and pro-Islamic goals
that underpin its revolutionary ideology, and establishes foreign allies that are invested in
Iranian reg...
Arabia and Iran, and a shared perception that one country gains influence at the expense of
the other. !45
The destabilizing posture of Iran’s exportation of its revolution as a progressive
model of...
146 Chipman and Staff, /ran’s Networks of Influence in the Middle East, 180-81. 147 Chipman and Staff, 180. 148 Ottoway, “Saudi Crown Prince Lambasts His Kingdom’s Wahhabi Establishment.”
149 Chipman ...
!55 IISS further explains that the traditional
definition of the term ‘proxy’ does not apply across the board for Iran’s varying regional
partnerships since ‘proxy’ implies Iran’s directive and unifor...
155 Chipman and Staff, 8. 156 Chipman and Staff, 8. 34 that impact Saudi Arabia, the following primary examples of Iranian-backed third parties
demonstrate the Axis’ external threat to Saudi Arabia’s ...
Enduring regional sectarian tensions
and Saudi’s fight against the Houthis—another Iran-backed foreign force—in Yemen
position Hezbollah to directly target Saudi infrastructure, as well as train other...
Iran
leverages the Houthis’ deep resentment towards Saudi Arabia and the West to galvanize
attacks against Saudi and western infrastructure in the Gulf, and provides the Houthis with
funding, training...
164 Chipman and Staff, 12, 28; Knights and Levitt, “The Evolution of Shi‘a Insurgency in Bahrain.”
165 Chipman and Staff, Jran’s Networks of Influence in the Middle East, 159. 36 Brotherhood—by deepen...
However, Hezbollah and Iran—who both supported the Syrian regime—minimally
punished Hamas by decreasing their funding and support, while allowing for future
rapprochement.!79 Saudi continues to public...
(4) Proxy Group Activity Against Saudi Arabia
Viewing the expulsion of United States and Western forces from the region as a
means of increasing its regional dominance, Iran has supported militant gr...
176 Chris Zambelis, “The Kingdom’s Perfect Storm: Sectarian Tension and Terrorism in Saudi
Arabia’s Eastern Province,” CTC Sentinel, (Combatting Terrorism Center at West Point, Vol. 9, Iss. 4:
April 2...
!79 Iran’s main objective in establishing
closer relations with Bahraini Shia was to inflict a retaliatory response against Saudi Arabia
and prepare the Bahraini Shia resistance for further uprisings ...
180 Knights and Levitt, 18. 181 Knights and Levitt, 23. 39 d. Tran’s Nuclear Program
Iran’s embryonic nuclear enrichment program has posed a growing, and possibly
existential threat to the Saudi regi...
183 New York Times Editorial Board, “One Way Forward on Iran: A Nuclear-Weapons-Free Persian
Gulf,” The New York Times, June 12, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/202 1/06/12/opinion/sunday/iran-
nuclear-...
Saudi’s concerns over an Iranian nuclear program and the two countries have conspired to
derail Iran’s nuclear program. !89
Iran’s nuclear program has ramifications for Saudi Arabia and beyond the f...
!94 Proxy
force activity undoubtedly could be deadlier if Iran had additional resources to purchase
more advanced weapons systems for its proxy groups. However, the uptick in proxy force
activity app...
Reviving the Iran Nuclear Deal Will Enhance Israel’s
Security;” Farnaz Fassihi and Steven Lee Myers, “China, With $400 Billion Iran Deal, Could Deepen
Influence in Mideast,” The New York Times, March ...
!97 In light of the breakdown of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive
Plan of Action (JCPOA), and Iran’s subsequent decision to reenergize it nuclear
enrichment program outside of peaceful purposes, Saudi Ara...
Volpe, “Abstinence or Tolerance: Managing Nuclear Ambitions
in Saudi Arabia,” The Washington Quarterly 41, no. 2 (April 3, 2018): 27,
https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2018.1484224. 199 Abadi, “Saudi A...
Saudi’s water purification and desertification prevention initiatives
would also robustly benefit from Israel’s agricultural expertise.2°4 With the second largest
economy in the Middle East behind the...
If MBS is sincerely determined
as he said to “coordinate and support the efforts to fight terrorism in all regions and parts
206 Hubbard, MBS: The Rise to Power of Mohammed Bin Salman, 107. 207 Jone...
213 King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies, “Vision 2030 and Reform in Saudi Arabia:
Facts and Figures April 2015-April 2021,” 27-28. 214 Jones and Guzansky, “Israel’s Relations with the ...
Rob Malley, a senior White House official in the Obama administration who
met with MBS on several occasions, remarked that “MBS comes from a generation of Saudi
leaders that doesn’t have a visceral, e...
221 Abadi, “Saudi Arabia’s Rapprochement with Israel: The National Security Imperatives,”
433,442,446; Podeh, “Saudi Arabia and Israel: From Secret to Public Engagement, 1948-2018,” 585. 222 Amer, “Wh...
administration policy on Saudi.227 Even if the next
administration mends any potential bad blood between the United States and Saudi from the
Biden administration, an unpredictable and vacillating rel...
Isn’t Batting for Him Anymore.”
47 THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
48 IV. SCENARIOS THAT PROMOTE OR INHIBIT SAUDI
ARABIA’S COOPERATION WITH ISRAEL
The previous chapter explained how the main dri...
CONDITIONS THAT PROMOTE SAUDI ARABIA’S COOPERATION
WITH ISRAEL
Saudi Arabia’s military and diplomatic cooperation with Israel against Iran, albeit
discreet, is furthered by neorealist Kenneth Waltz’ ...
Lastly, Saudi’s relationship with the Unites States as an partner, mentor, weapons dealer
and security guarantor is waning under the current U.S. administration. As the United
States distances itself ...
Neither Saudi Arabia nor Israel benefit from Iran
influencing the Palestinian people. Saudi Arabia loses influence as the protector of the
229 Reza Parchizadeh, “The Shiite Crescent: The Middle East...
Furthermore,
during a televised speech in early May 2021 in recognition of Iran’s annual Quds Day—a
day of protest on the last Friday of Ramadan to express solidarity with the Sunni
Palestinians and o...
235
The impending renegotiation of the JCPOA agreement complicates Saudi Arabia
and Israel’s strategic cooperation, and depending on the renegotiation terms, has the
potential to either expand or der...
At the very least, Saudi Arabia and Israel would
both feel less secure as Iran’s security drastically increases with the attainment of a nuclear
bomb. It would be far easier for Saudi and Israel to co...
239 Brown and Brown, “Saudi Arabia’s Religious Reforms Are Touching Nothing but Changing
Everything - Islamic Institutions in Arab States.”
53 angered many of the other royals—those who were passed o...
Economic Cooperation with Israel
A mutually beneficial economic partnership between Saudi Arabia and Israel is a
solid foundation for creating deep-rooted ties that could accelerate rapprochement bet...
245 Podeh, “Saudi Arabia and Israel, From Secret to Public Engagement, 1948-2018,” 584. 246 Abadi, “Saudi Arabia’s Rapprochement with Israel: The National Security Imperatives,” 443-44;
Rynhold and Ya...
7. The United States Withdraws from the Middle East
U.S. retrenchment from the Middle East could galvanize cooperation between
Saudi Arabia and Israel if the other two primary drivers of cooperation—...
withdraws its support to Saudi’s war in Yemen, and distances itself both politically and
militarily with Saudi Arabia, the consequences could be similar to Saudi and Israel’s
response to the Obama adm...
Isn’t Batting for Him Anymore.”
254 Shaun Tandon, “Reframing Mideast, Biden Seems to Signal New Distance from Allies Israel,
Saudis,” The Times of Israel, February 6, 2021, https://www.timesofisrael....
However, progress of any of these
variables will undoubtedly impede Saudi and Israel’s existing and future cooperative
efforts. 1. Saudi Arabia Pursues a Nuclear Weapon
Saudi Arabia considered devel...
withdrawal from
JCPOA, the agreement only stalled Iran’s nuclear program for 15 years.26! Saudi Arabia
had already planned to pursue a latent nuclear weapons capacity as part of its longer term
nuclea...
Saudi’s pursuit of a nuclear weapons program would at the very least create an
intermission to its cooperative arrangement with Israel as Israel weighs its response
options. All other regional dynamic...
None of the available options to temper Saudi Arabia’s
nuclear ambitions are simple or straightforward. However, it is clear that Saudi Arabia’s
pursuit of nuclear weapons would radically alter its cu...
Without alleviating Saudi
Arabia and Israel’s concerns over Iran’s nuclear program and Saudi remaining non-nuclear,
the strategic context of Saudi Arabia and Israel’s relationship endures.2°? 2. Iran...
271 Bostock, “Saudi Arabia Is Trying to Patch Things up with Bitter Rivals Iran and Turkey, Showing
MBS Knows the U.S. Isn’t Batting for Him Anymore.”
61 Western influence in the region by creating s...
273 Ali Harb, “Saudi Arabia-Iran Rapprochement: What Is Driving Push for Diplomacy?,” Middle
East Eye, May 5, 2021, http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/mohammed-bin-salman-saudi-arabia-iran-
rapprocheme...
Considering
that MBS has nurtured an ironclad relationship with his father that allowed him to skip
other royals in succession to the throne, buffer himself from royal criticism, and overhaul
the Saud...
Despite increasing authoritarianism
within Saudi, MBS has spearheaded “perhaps the most far-reaching alterations” to the
Saudi governance system since its founding, so he may in fact be a visionary fo...
Whether as a solitary
move, or coordinated effort with other drivers that inhibit Saudi’s cooperation with Israel,
Saudi’s funding of the Palestinian cause against Israel would break down the cooperat...
actors, making this course of action a wild card. With all other factors constant, U.S. abandonment of Saudi could further push Saudi towards Israel in a realist balance-of-power
scramble against Iran...
“Twin
Pillar” policy—heavily relying on security cooperation between Saudi Arabia and Iran to
protect U.S. interests in the region—worked in the 1970s, the 1979 Revolution transformed
Iran’s entire go...
MACRO INTERACTION BETWEEN CAUSAL MECHANISMS
This chapter explored the conditions in which the main drivers of Saudi cooperation
with Israel—mutual concern over Iran, Saudi’s secular reform initiative...
As MBS’s religious reform initiatives accelerate to promote cooperation
with Israel, Iran’s ideological threat increases to both Saudi and Israel. 3. Decreased U.S. influence in the Middle East incre...
influence on the relationship between Saudi and Israel does not necessarily change. However,
the dynamics of how these drivers singularly impact the problem set, overlaid with this macro
perspective o...
The
contention emerges from Israel’s policies toward Palestinians and occupation of
Palestinian territory, including the holy city of Jerusalem. After decades of exchanging
harsh rhetoric and Israel’s...
This
thesis rigorously examined how those factors have interacted during the 21st century for a
more holistic understanding of what Saudi Arabia and Israel’s relationship hinges on now
and in the futu...
influence has been on promoting cooperation between Saudi Arabia
and Israel over the last two decades, short of normalization. Chapter IV then analyzed
hypothetical conditions that would further or in...
administration, a renegotiation of the Iranian
nuclear deal, and recent reconciliatory dialogue between Saudi Arabia and Iran change the
conditions under which the three drivers towards Saudi and Isra...
willingness and ability
to project strategic leadership across the region, and more importantly when the United
States is unwilling or unable to do so.292
Contrary to their historical animosity, Sau...
293 Bostock, “Saudi Arabia Is Trying to Patch Things up with Bitter Rivals Iran and Turkey, Showing
MBS Knows the U.S. Isn’t Batting for Him Anymore.”
294 Harb, “Saudi Arabia-Iran Rapprochement: What...
However, this relationship has ebbed and flowed over the
course of the last two decades, with a less favorable relationship under the Obama
administration, a reinvigorated sense of partnership under t...
However, that
strategic context is challenged by recent changes in the political environment. A. IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY
The Middle East endures in its pivotal role in United States foreign pol...
national security emanating from
malign actors in the Middle East do not disappear simply because we have pivoted to a
more pressing problem set, such as great power competition. U.S. actions and inac...
It would be a good news story for Saudi Arabia
and Israel to continue their trajectory of cooperation without U.S. influence as a driver, but
removing U.S. influence impacts the salience of the other ...
“Saudi Arabia’s Rapprochement with Israel: The National Security
Imperatives.” Middle Eastern Studies 55, no. 3 (May 4, 2019): 433-49. https://doi.org/10.1080/00263206.2018.1509853
Abu Mustafa, Ibrah...
“State-Sponsored Fatwas in Saudi Arabia.” Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, n.d. https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/7597 1. Ali, Dr Mohamed Bin. “Al-Wala’ Wal Bara’ in Wahhabism: From A Tool...
Arms Control Association, “The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) at a
Glance,” Arms Control Association, July 2021,
https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/JCPOA-at-a-glance. Ayoob, Mohammed, ...
Reviving the Iran Nuclear Deal Will Enhance
Israel’s Security.” Washington Post, May 26, 2021. https://www. washingtonpost.com/opinions/202 1/05/26/gaza-war-isnt-an-
argument-against-iran-nuclear-deal...
Policy: The Rouhani Administration
Between Continuity and Change, Opportunity and Constraint.” In Jran in the
World: President Rouhani’ s Foreign Policy. Springer, 2016. “Constitution of the Islamic R...
“Iran Clears Way for Hard-Line Judiciary Chief to Become President.”
The New York Times, May 28, 2021. https://www.nytimes.com/202 1/05/28/world/middleeast/iran-election-khamenei-
raisi.html
Fassihi,...
“Saudi Crown Prince: Iran’s Supreme Leader ‘Makes Hitler Look
Good.’” The Atlantic, April 2, 2018. https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/04/mohammed-bin-
salman-iran-israel/557036/. G...
for Pause in Nuclear Talks.”
Reuters, July 28, 2021, sec. Middle East. https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-
east/irans-khamenei-blames-cowardly-us-pause-nuclear-talks-202 1 -07-28/. ——. “Tran’s Khame...
Harkov, Lahav, “Bennett Plans to Continue Netanyahu’s Iran Policies,” The Jerusalem
Post, June 13, 2021, https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/bennett-plans-to-
continue-netanyahu-iran-policies-670883. Ho...
“Israel’s Relations with the Gulf States: Toward the
Emergence of a Tacit Security Regime?” Contemporary Security Policy 38, no. 3
(September 2, 2017): 398-419. https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2017.1...
“Vision 2030 and Reform in Saudi
Arabia: Facts and Figures April 2015-April 2021.” Kingdom of Saudi Arabia,
May 2021. Knights, Michael and Matthew Levitt, “The Evolution of Shi'a Insurgency in Bahrain...
“American Support for Israel: History, Sources, Limits.” Israel Affairs
2, no. 3-4 (1996): 128-46. https://doi.org/10.1080/135371296087 19397. Malhi, Sabrina. “How Israel Can Contribute to Saudi’s Vis...
“Saudi Foreign Minister Says Normalisation with Israel Would Bring
‘Tremendous Benefits.’” Middle East Eye, April 2, 2021. http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/saudi-arabia-israel-foreign-minister-
norma...
“Iran Has Enriched Uranium to up to 63% Purity, IAEA Says.”
Reuters, May 11, 2021, sec. Middle East. https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-
east/iran-has-enriched-uranium-up-63-purity-iaea-report-says-...
“Iran, Its Clients, and the Future of the Middle East: The Limits of
Religion.” /nternational Affairs 94, no. 6 (November 1, 2018): 1237-55. https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiy185. ——. “The Grand Strategy ...
“The Shiite Crescent: The Middle East’s Arc of Crisis,” Begin-Sadat
Center for Strategic Studies (blog), March 7, 2021, https://besacenter.org/shtite-
crescent-crisis/
Podeh, Elie. “Saudi Arabia and ...
Nuclear Logics: Contrasting Paths in East Asia and the Middle East. Princeton, UNITED STATES: Princeton University Press, 2007. http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ebook-nps/detail.action?docID=44555...
“Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power.” Jnternational
Security 9, no. 4 (1985). Waltz, Kenneth Neal. Theory of International Politics. Long Grove, Ill: Waveland Press,
2010. 80 Xiyue, Wan...
“Netanyahu Has Joined the Disgraceful Journey of His Anti-Iran Co-
Conspirators.” Twitter, June 3, 2021. https://twitter.com/JZarif/status/1400495 114737360901. . “Palestine Is a Yardstick for Justice...
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