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iranian-saudi-agreement.pdf
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Title: Bridging Borders: The Geopolitical Dance of Iran, Saudi Arabia, and China
Description: Delve into the intricate web of diplomacy and strategic alliances as Iran and Saudi Arabia navigate a delicate dance, with China as a significant influence. From the genesis of the Iranian-Saudi agreement to potential economic benefits and maritime cooperation, the document explores the evolving landscape of international relations and security dynamics in the Gulf, offering insights into the shifting power dynamics in the region.
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2026-03-02 11:53
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Chunks (14)
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Arab Center for Research & Policy Studies
| 23 March 2023
lranian-Saudi Agreement
Banafsheh Keynoush lranian-Saudi Agreement
Series: Case Analysis
23 Mar...
Table of Contents
Precursors of the Iranian-SaudiAgreement oo od
How Durable is the Iranian-Saudi Agreement? a a)
What does the Iranian-Saudi agreement mean for economic development and an
Asia pivo...
Riyadh expects to continue its talks with Tehran
and curb the conflict by expanding bilateral relations. Precursors of the Iranian-Saudi Agreement
The Iranian-Saudi agreement came after five rounds o...
3 “Riyaz: Omidvarim goft-o-guhaye sazandeh ba Iran edameh yabad (Riyadh: We hope that constructive talks with Iran will continue),” Fars News, March
14, 2023, https://bit.ly/3JXMaeE. 4 “Amir-Abdollahi...
Tehran contained the protests by late
November, and it refused to halt the rapid pace of its nuclear enrichment program. These actions,
according to the hardline Iranian newspaper Kayhan, were instrum...
14 “Amir-Abdollahian: Takeed bar solh dar mantageh az jomleh tavafogat Iran va Riyaz bode hast (Emphasis on regional peace has been one of the
agreements between Iran and Riyadh)”. 15 “lranin Focus as...
context:
The chunk discusses the durability of the Iranian-Saudi Agreement, sharing perspectives from Iran and Saudi Arabia on the agreement.
fact:
Qasim Soleimani laid the foundations of the Iranian-Saudi deal and proposed a ten-year non-escalation pact between Iran and Saudi Arabia before his death in January 2020.
Moving forward, Iran aims to discourage Saudi Arabia from joining the US-brokered 2020 Abraham
Accords.”° Tehran expects Riyadh to avoid fully aligning its policies with the United States and Israel
t...
context:
This chunk provides updates on the Iranian-Saudi Agreement, including recent diplomatic efforts involving Iran, Saudi Arabia, China, and the US. The chunk explores the potential implications of Iran aiming to discourage Saudi Arabia from joining the US-brokered 2020 Abraham Accords, with a focus on how the expanded security cooperation deals from the accords could impact their alignment with the United States and Israel.
context:
The chunk explores the potential implications of Iran aiming to discourage Saudi Arabia from joining the US-brokered 2020 Abraham Accords, with a focus on how the expanded security cooperation deals from the accords could impact their alignment with the United States and Israel.
19 “Chera bayad beh tawafog Iran va ‘Arabestan khosh-bin bud? (Why should we be optimistic about lran-Saudi agreement)”. 20 “Aya sarnevesht-e Anvar Sadat dar entezar-e ben Salman ast? (Is bin Salman’s...
The agreement's stated commitment to non-interference on issues pertaining to state sovereignty
need not clash with Iranian support for its axis of resistance if interpreted in a manner that
accommoda...
(Why should we be optimistic about Iran-Saudi agreement)”. 24 “Hossein shari'atmadari: Shoma chera matam gerefteh-ed?! Negarani Israel az ehya-ye ravabet-e Tehran va Riyaz/ Navid tahavolate mosbat bar...
lranian-Saudi Agreement
Further talks between Iran and Saudi Arabia can help Tehran boost its sanctioned economy, and
enable Riyadh to reach its Vision 2030 economic and development goals. The safety...
Russia would support this path if it ensures multilateralism in the nuclear sphere, and reduces US
presence in the Gulf region.” Additionally, this path could be better than an emerging anarchical
non...
As a result, no matter how evasive the
goal, replenishing the balance of power regime between them seems essential to ensuring regional
stability, and the viability of the lranian-Saudi agreement. Sau...
Instead, through this latest deal,
Tehran and Riyadh have more manoeuvrability to navigate difficult regional dynamics, for example
over the Iranian axis of influence, the issue of proliferation, and ...
context:
Further talks between Iran and Saudi Arabia can help Tehran boost its sanctioned economy, and enable Riyadh to reach its Vision 2030 economic and development goals. The safety of navigation in the Gulf waterway is critical to realizing the fullest trade and commercial potential. To this end, the two sides could expand maritime cooperation in the Gulf region, the Bab-el-Mandeb and the Red Sea, and secure navigation through the Suez Canal and the Mediterranean region. Tehran and Riyadh are not contemplative about the question of the real winners in this deal. It was enough for both capitals that China’s role in building the deal signalled that Asian conflicts can be resolved through pan-Asian responses, through multilateralism while rejecting unilateral US policies. China, meanwhile, placed the burden of responsibility on Iran and Saudi Arabia to deliver peace and stability in the Gulf should they wish to remain strong partners for Asia. In this case, the Saudi and Iranian positions in BRICS Plus starting in 2023 as states officially joining the bloc and in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, as well as in a host of other Asian/Eurasian markets, could advance. The underlying notion for advancing the Iranian-Saudi cooperation through China is to use this country as a guarantor of mutual progress in the energy sector, where the partnership with Asia is crucial to increasing a budget surplus for both Iran and Saudi Arabia. This trilateral partnership could even extend into the nuclear arena to develop effective deterrence regimes through BRICS where three members are nuclear states and the other two had nuclear weaponization paths of their own which combined brings plenty of experience to the table by way of advancing deterrence regimes. It could also enable Saudi Arabia to acquire advanced nuclear know-how on its quest for nuclear security, a path that China previously helped Iran take, without there being a need for a cascading effect for nuclear weaponization for the purpose of security by either the Saudis or the Iranians should the right policy and approaches be adopted. Russia would support this path if it ensures multilateralism in the nuclear sphere, and reduces US presence in the Gulf region. Additionally, this path could be better than an emerging anarchical non-polar nuclear regime in which the Israeli and Iranian nuclear programs dominate the regional order. Instead, through this latest deal, Tehran and Riyadh have more manoeuvrability to navigate difficult regional dynamics, for example over the Iranian axis of influence, the issue of proliferation, and on controlling Iranian or Saudi threats in fluid security spheres that call for non-military answers to problem-solving.