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Title: Shifting Sands: The Dynamics of US Policy in the Middle East
Description: Exploring the intricate web of relationships in the Middle East, this document delves into the contrasting foreign policy visions of the Trump and Biden administrations. From the consequences of US withdrawal and unpredictability under Trump to the potential changes in diplomacy and international engagements expected under Biden, the region is at a pivotal crossroads. As key players like Saudi Arabia, Iran, Israel, and Turkey navigate the evolving landscape, the US remains a central but evolving figure in the dynamics of the Middle East.
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‘ST ANPEL INIA S
'STANBUL
POLITICAL RESEARCH
INSTITUTE
THE MIDDLE EAST AFTER TRUMP:
A RESHUFFLING OF THE CARDS? Galip Dalay
The Middle East’s preparation for the Joe Biden presidency is in full gea...
fact:
Saudi Arabia is patching up relations with Qatar to de-escalate tension in the Gulf.
fact:
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is sending mixed messages amid the changing US political landscape.
In the
end, despite the fact that in recent years the
region’s relations with international powers
are attaining a multipolar character with the
increasing prominence of Russia in regional
security an...
fact:
The US remains a significant actor in Middle East affairs despite the rise of other international powers like Russia and China. The US represents more than primus inter pares in the region, having put its imprint, if not hegemony, on the region's politics since 1956.
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sented the decline of European imperial pow-
er and the primacy of the US in regional af-
fairs. It is not only US actions in the region, but also
its ...
To state it
differently, the US withdrawal from the region
did not begin with Trump, rather it started with
the Obama administration. This downsizing of
the US presence in the region takes the form
of...
In other
words, not only has Trump had little regard
for rule of law or human rights in Middle East-
ern state’s domestic politics, he has also had
little respect and concern for the rules, norms
and ...
Whereas the Arab
states’ fear of the Arab Spring stems from
regime insecurity and illegitimacy, Israel is
opposed to the same phenomenon, believing
that if successful, this regional transformation
wil...
context:
The text discusses the Middle East's response to the change in US presidency from Trump to Biden. The region's relations with international powers are attaining a multipolar character with the increasing prominence of Russia and China, but the US remains the indispensable actor for regional (in)security and (dis)order. The US has had a significant influence on the region's politics since the Suez Crisis of 1956. It is not only US actions in the region, but also its inactions that matters a great deal, arguably sometimes even more so, as the evolution of the Syrian crisis can attest. The places the US occupies as well as the void that it leaves in the region can have formative impacts on the regional politics. In this respect, as Middle Eastern actors adjusted their foreign policies to the Trumpian world, they will also adjust them to the Biden presidency. But are these two figures so different from each other when it comes to their foreign policy visions, particularly in approaches to the Middle East? Trump: Everyone for himself/herself world Withdrawal, unpredictability, personalisation of relations, and a diplomatic deficit represented the US policy towards the region under Trump. To state it differently, the US withdrawal from the region did not begin with Trump, rather it started with the Obama administration. This downsizing of the US presence in the region takes the form of the US downsizing its commitments more than its capabilities. The US still maintains formidable military capabilities and diplomatic networks in the region. On these features, it maintains primacy over other actors. However, under Trump, the US has not only downsized its commitments to the region, it also reduced its diplomatic engagements and initiatives in the region. Further compounding the US retreat from the region, Trump effectively sent a message that this is an everyone for himself/herself—accelerating the decline of the international institutions, norms, and principles in the conduct of international affairs. Many regional powers have adjusted themselves to this Trumpian world. To cite one example, Arab Gulf states’ blockade* on Qatar would not have happened, if it was not green-lighted by Trump. The US downsizing of its role in the region coupled with Trump’s view of international affairs has set off scrambles amongst different regional players for more influence and power in the MENA region. In other words, not only has Trump had little regard for rule of law or human rights in Middle Eastern states' domestic politics, he has also had little respect and concern for the rules, norms, and institutions in the conduct of the intra-regional politics. Biden will certainly bring more predictability, institutions, and diplomacy into his Middle Eastern policy. Even if not the policy and politics of regional transformation, Biden can adopt the language of human rights, good governance and democratisation. These changes in themselves will prove to be consequential. However, Biden is unlikely to scale up the US commitments in the region— in the end, the policy of the US retreat from the region started under the Obama administration, in which Biden served as vice president. Arguably, the strategic value of the Middle East is decreasing for the US and a Biden presidency will not change this basic fact.
Arguably, the strategic value of the Mid-
dle East is decreasing for the US and a Biden
presidency will not change this basic fact. Unlike Trump, the Biden administration is set
to bring three things ...
Biden, in contrast, is likely to try to accommo-
date part of their concerns during diplomatic
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engagement with Iran. Putting this aside,
Biden is li...
fact:
Israel is suspected of assassinating Iran's top nuclear scientist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, impacting Iran's options and diplomacy. Biden, in contrast, is likely to try to accommodate part of Arab Gulf states' concerns during diplomatic engagement with Iran. Putting this aside, Biden is likely to pursue a more anti-Russian policy in the region. Having said that, this does not mean the US will not seek some form of an understanding with Russia in Syria. Finally, the approach to Turkey is set to become another difference between the Biden and Trump administrations. During the Trump era, Erdogan established close personal relations with the US president, who shielded Turkey from the wrath of US institutions on many accounts. To be more precise, during the Trump administration, a divergence between Europe and the US, as well as between Trump and US institutions on Turkey, increased Turkey’s room to manoeuvre. During Biden’s presidency, it is highly likely there will be a double convergence between Biden and US institutions, as well as between the US and Europe, on Turkey. This in itself is set to generate more friction in relations. On top of this, four issues will test the relations from early on.
On top
of this, four issues will test the relations from
early on. Turkey’s purchase of the Russian-
NOTES
ANALYSIS
made S-400 missile systems, the Syrian
Kurds, the eastern Mediterranean crisis, a...
fact:
Turkey’s purchase of the Russian-made S-400 missile systems, the Syrian Kurds, the eastern Mediterranean crisis, and Biden’s propensity to speak on the domestic developments in Turkey are issues that will test relations from early on.
The Biden admin-
istration will have to factor these changes into
its MENA policies. 1. https:/Avww.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-551 28970
2. https:/Avwww.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-1 1-13/e...
https:/Avww.iiss.org/blogs/survival-blog/2020/03/iran-united-states-maximum-pressure
Brookings Institution Doha Centre
Galip Dalay is Richard von Weizsacker Fellow at Robert Bosch Academy and non-re...