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10.53306-klujfeas.1329020-3271064.pdf

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Title: Navigating the Paradox: U.S.-Iran Relations and Foreign Policy Rollercoaster
Description: Delving into the tumultuous history of U.S.-Iran relations, this document explores the complex interplay of diplomacy, conflict, and shifting strategies across multiple presidential administrations. From the impact of Trump's anti-Iran stance to Biden's reconciliation efforts, it traces the ebbs and flows, with a spotlight on the challenges hindering a breakthrough. Spanning decades of history, it unveils the intricate dynamics shaping the geopolitical landscape between two nations.
Tags: U.S. Iran foreign policy diplomacy nuclear agreement bilateral relations presidential administrations sanctions historical background geopolitics regional dynamics economic warfare conflict resolution international relations
Status: finished
Pages: 21
Uploaded: 2026-03-02 09:54
Last Processed: 2026-03-02 10:41

Chunks (73)

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United States-Iran Relations: The Trump Impact Article Type Research Article Application Date 18.07.2023 Acceptance Date 06.09.2023 DOI 10.53306/klujfeas.1329020 Emirhan KAYA? Abstract bilate...
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It is Trump pushed the bilateral icy legacy prevailed over Keywords: The United States of America, Iran, foreign policy, sanctions, nuclear deal. 1 Res. Asst. Dr., Trakya University Faculty of Econ...
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Son zamanlarda, gic kullanma hala cekici bir secenek olsa da Baskan Joe Biden’in iran ile yeniden angajmana girme olasilig1 sorgulanmaktadir. Bu baglamda makale, sirasiyla Obama, Trump ve Biden’in bas...
fact: Key terms: United States, Iran, foreign policy, sanctions, nuclear agreement.
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Dr., Trakya Universitesi iktisadi ve idari Bilimler Fakiltesi, Uluslararasi iliskiler BOolumd, emirhankaya@trakya.edu.tr, ORCID: 0000-0001-9034-6598 Kirklareli Universitesi iktisadi ve idari Bilimle...
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More recently, the U.S.-lran tensions peaked under Trump when Qasem Soleimani, a senior Iranian general, was killed in January 2020. Currently, the U.S. aims to make Iran obey the nuclear imits on enr...
fact: Recent discussions question the likelihood of President Joe Biden re-engaging with Iran.
fact: The recent fluctuations in bilateral relations will be understood through a comparative perspective.
fact: It is suggested that Trump's anti-Iran strategy created a deadlock in bilateral relations and hindered the reconciliation efforts with Iran by the Obama and Biden administrations.
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attempts to normalize bilateral relations during both previous and subsequent periods. Furthermore, the article also takes into account of the stance of the American Congress that has particularly aff...
context: The new chunk provides further historical background on the U.S.-Iran relations, highlighting the bilateral relations during previous periods and the role of the American Congress in affecting U.S. sanctions policy against Iran.
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While Mohammad Reza Shah, who ruled Iran between 1942 and 1979, was in need of American assistance against the Soviet Union in the aftermath of the Second World War, Iran and Israel were both in oppos...
context: The new chunk discusses the historical relationship between Iran, the United States, and Israel, particularly during Mohammad Reza Shah's rule from 1942 to 1979. The text mentions the need for American assistance against the Soviet Union, opposition to pan-Arabism, and U.S. intervention in Iran's internal affairs. President Dwight D. Eisenhower's support for the ouster of Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh in 1953 is highlighted.
fact: Mohammad Reza Shah ruled Iran between 1942 and 1979 and sought American assistance against the Soviet Union. Iran and Israel opposed the pan-Arabism movement together, allowing the U.S. to intervene in Iran's internal affairs. President Dwight D. Eisenhower supported the ouster of Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh in 1953 due to his nationalization attempt of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company.
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ally, was provided economic and military aid during the 1950s and 1960s. Moreover, the U.S. firms were granted considerable oil concessions during that period (Ryan, 2018, p. 98-99). By the end of the...
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Furthermore, Henry Kissinger, the chief oreign policy advisor of President Nixon, formulated the “twin pillar” policy of strengthening Iran and Saudi Arabia at the same time in order to maintain a bal...
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It has been considered as a pivotal event that still affects the perception of Iran in the U.S. (Amies, 2018, p. 59). Subsequently, Iran was blamed for the two deadly attacks within six months in Beir...
context: The new chunk discusses the historical events that influenced the perception of Iran in the U.S., including pivotal events like the deadly attacks in Beirut in 1983. It also mentions the U.S. official policy of neutrality during the Iran-Iraq war of 1980-1988, which later shifted in favor of Iraq.
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pursued an official policy of neutrality during the Iran-Iraq war of 1980-1988, yet the direction of American aid shifted in favor of Iraq, notably after Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in 1982 (Hunter, ...
context: The chunk discusses the continued rivalry between the U.S. and Iran even after the Cold War, highlighting the diminishing need for Iran as a buffer against the Soviet Union in the post-Cold War era. Both countries have historical traumas in their bilateral relations. The text mentions unsuccessful attempts by Hashemi Rafsanjani (1989-1997) and Mohammad Khatami (1997-2005) to improve U.S.-Iran relations, the growth of U.S.-Israel relations under the George W. Bush administration, and Iraq emerging as the sole regional military threat to Israel after the First Gulf War.
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Furthermore, following the First Gulf War that ended the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, it remained as the only potential regional military threat to Israel. Accordingly, Iran would place more importance...
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lran was also concerned that it was tried to be kept out of the post-Cold War regional order mainly because of its formal opposition to the Madrid peace process between Israel and Arab states. Iran’s ...
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Presidents, using waiver authority in order not to adversely affect the relations with European partners, did not apply any sanctions under ILSA until it was superseded by the Comprehensive Iran Sanct...
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The Presidency of Mahmoud Ahmedinejad between 2005 and 2013 further hampered the opportunities for cooperation (Fawcett and Payne, 2022, p. 6). Consequently, the hostility reached such a level that U....
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on nuclear cooperation under the Atoms for Peace program in 1957 and thus first established its nuclear program, the U.S. opposed Iran’s quest for a plutonium reprocessing capability in the mid-1970s....
context: The new chunk delves into the history of Iran's nuclear program, including its cooperation with China and Russia in the 1990s and the international concerns arising from the revelation of nuclear facilities in the early 2000s.
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KAYA; Amerika Birlesik Devletleri-iran iliskileri: Trump Etkisi, 275-295. Russia, and the U.S. joined the talks in 2006 and Iran’s refusal to stop its uranium enrichment activities during these negoti...
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In fact, Iran voluntarily ceased enriching uranium between 2003 and 2005; however, the Bush administration adopted a maximalist stance by refusing Iran’s right to uranium enrichment under the Treaty o...
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On the other hand, it was argued that the authority of this fatwa was controversial since the religious concept and practice of tagiyya permitted Shia leaders to conceal their faith under threat (Mous...
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Bush opposed such legislation, he intensified diplomatic pressure on foreign governments in order to curb their investments in Iran’s energy sector. Furthermore, the U.S. designated the Iranian Revolu...
fact: The article will shed light on the U.S.-Iran relations during the presidencies of Obama, Trump, Biden, and Bush.
fact: The article aims to identify elements of continuity and change in the U.S. foreign policy toward Iran from 2009 to the present, covering the presidencies of Obama, Trump, Biden, and Bush respectively.
fact: It is mainly argued that the foreign policy legacy of Trump and Bush, whose decisions paralyzed the bilateral relations, prevailed over the efforts to reconcile with Iran by the Obama and Biden administrations.
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because it may not have the ability to defend its regional partners against a nuclear-armed Iran (Edelman et al., 2011, p. 67). In that context, although President Obama, coming into office in January...
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Obama implemented such sanctions due to political pressures, particularly from pro-Israel groups even though he had opt-out authority. It was also reminded that Congressional pressures for tougher san...
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has been imposing several unilateral sanctions on Iran since 1979, the multilateral sanctions that were levied by the UNSC and the European Union (EU) dated back to 2006. In this process, “the most im...
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Meanwhile, popular protests against the results of June 2009 presidential elections led to Iranian accusations that the U.S. and some of its European allies intended to trigger a color revolution in I...
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allies in the Gulf were anxious about lran’s efforts to produce nuclear bomb (Mintz & Wayne, 2016, p. 113-118). For that reason, the Obama administration intended to achieve a balance of deterrence to...
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In case of Obama, his re-election in November 2012 eased the path for a non-zero enrichment deal (Fawcett & Payne, 2022, p. 15). The shift in Obama’s stance against Iran became apparent as the nuclear...
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As a remarkable indication of the declining Iranian economy, its oil revenues decreased 65% between 2011 and 2013 (Rajiv, 2016, p. 51). Rouhani’s election was a turning point for lran-U.S. relations m...
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Furthermore, it was a diplomatic success for Iran since the U.S. accepted Iran’s right to enrich uranium. On the other hand, Iran agreed to limit the growth and enhance the transparency of its nuclear...
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On the other hand, Israel that had considered the UNSC resolutions as inefficient since Iran continued to advance its nuclear program, was also against the diplomatic strategy pursued by the P5+1 and ...
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Thus, the Congress would have 60 days to review the deal and then the President was required to report to Congress every 90 days about whether Iran was in compliance with the agreement (Lantis, 2019, ...
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French energy company Total was the first Western firm to sign a deal with Iran (Entessar & Afrasiabi, 2020, p. 92) Following the “breaking of the petroleum dam”, energy giants such as Royal Dutch She...
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Accordingly, it was stressed that Trump would instead support an agreement “that banned Iranian nuclear enrichment at any level in perpetuity and permitted no-notice inspections anywhere in Iran” (Sim...
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withdrew from the JCPOA on May 8, 2018, despite he deal did not have a withdrawal clause and such a decision constituted a material breach. Furthermore, Tillerson stated that the deal was not viable d...
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would not carry on business with “anyone doing business with Iran” (Reuters, 2018). From a broader perspective, it was even argued that the Republican Trump administration maintained “purposefully and...
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encouragement of Arab countries to make peace with Israel and its downplaying approach toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict were considered as part of Trump’s maximum pressure strategy (Tang & Pan,...
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In short, it turned out that Trump’s maximum pressure strategy had no significant external support. In addition to U.S. willingness to work with regional and international coalitions, the centerpiece ...
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Although Iran is a ion alleged that the absence of Iranian oil in the world oil market would not have a significant impact on the supply side (Entessar & Afrasiabi, 2020, p. 96). On the other hand, e...
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The Kirklareli Universitesi iktisadi ve idari Bilimler Fakiiltesi Dergisi ISSN: 2146-3417 | E-ISSN: 2587-2052 Cilt 12, Say: 02, Eylul 2023 284 285 KAYA; United States-Iran Relations: The Trump Impa...
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Moreover, the domestic unrest continued to worry the Iranian government in 2019 and 2020 considerably (Lansford, 2021, p. 769). In response to the economic warfare waged by the U.S., Iran developed “R...
fact: Iran developed a 'Resistance Economy' in response to the economic warfare by the U.S., focusing on economic self-reliance and reducing dependence on oil exports.
fact: Iran implemented evasion tactics to export oil, including opening an oil terminal in the Gulf of Oman to bypass the Strait of Hormuz and seeking alternative markets in neighboring countries.
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had the ability to re-open the strait in a short time if this threat materialized, it was admitted hat oil prices would spike (CNBC, 2018). Furthermore, a new payment channel called INSTEX The Instrum...
fact: The U.S. acknowledged that although they could reopen the Strait of Hormuz quickly if closed, oil prices would surge in such a scenario. The reimposition of economic sanctions inflicted serious damage on the Iranian economy, but Trump’s maximum pressure strategy did not yield expected results as Iran continued to grow its centrifuge technology and missile program. The U.S. withdrawal from the deal and the new sanctions changed the internal balance of power in Iran and weakened the position of reformers. Ebrahim Raisi, who became Iranian President in August 2021, even alleged that external threats helped Iranian society become more cohesive (Tang & Pan, 2022, p. 192-193).
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In September 2020, the UN envoys of Britain, France and Germany declared that they were still committed to preserve the nuclear deal and implement the 2015 UNSC resolution although the U.S., no longer...
context: The new chunk provides an overview of the historical background and recent developments in the U.S.-Iran relations. The U.S.-lran tensions peaked under Trump when Qasem Soleimani, a senior Iranian general, was killed in January 2020. Currently, the U.S. aims to make Iran obey the nuclear limits on enriched uranium and centrifuges, while Iran seeks to lift the economic sanctions imposed by the Trump administration. Although the Joe Biden administration took a more cooperative stance towards Iran, he has not so far been able to lead to a significant turn in the U.S.-Iran relations yet. The article aims to identify elements of continuity and change in the U.S. foreign policy toward Iran from 2009 to present, covering the presidencies of Obama, Trump and Biden respectively. It is mainly argued that the foreign policy legacy of Trump, whose decision to withdraw from the deal paralyzed the bilateral relations, prevailed over the efforts to reconcile with Iran by both Obama and Biden administrations.
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was not Kirklareli University Journal of the Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences ISSN: 2146-3417 | E-ISSN: 2587-2052 Volume 12, Issue 02, September 2023 KAYA; Amerika Birlesik Devletleri...
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In the aftermath of the American killing of Qasem Soleimani in January 2020, the Iranian government announced that there would be no imitations in the nuclear enrichment capacity (Rubin et al., 2020)....
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credibility in the eyes of its European allies (Council on Foreign Relations, 2019). It was also underlined that Trump’s Iran policy proved to be counterproductive since the sanctions have strengthene...
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The coming into power of a Democrat President is not a sufficient condition for an “automatic reset” in bilateral relations since the changes in Iranian as well as the Middle Eastern politics created ...
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Furthermore, the withdrawal of American forces from Afghanistan has fueled Iran’s fear that Kirklareli Universitesi iktisadi ve idari Bilimler Fakiiltesi Dergisi ISSN: 2146-3417 | E-ISSN: 2587-2052 C...
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In the 2022 National Defense Strategy of the U.S., it was reiterated that Iran undermined regional stability since it supported terrorist groups and military proxies including al-Qaeda and ISIS (U.S. ...
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The Iranian hardliners believe that China, having no ideological problem with Iran, has the potential to “replace the West as a source of technology and capital” (Kahalzadeh, 2022, p. 8). In March 202...
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The critics suggest that Chinese firms buying the illicit oil should be penalized (Phillips & Brookes, 2022a, p. 7-8). The advocates of a stricter foreign policy towards Iran suggest that the U.S. sho...
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Accordingly, in April 2021, while informal negotiations to reinstate the 2015 nuclear deal were taking place in Vienna, Iran’s Natanz uranium enrichment facility was attacked by the Israelis, accordin...
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While the death of Amini unleashed global condemnation, the U.S. imposed sanctions Iranian morality police and seven security officials who frequently used violence to suppress peaceful protestors and...
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Later on, the Biden administration, despite facing domestic and international challenges, intended to revive the nuclear negotiations with Iran in order to achieve a broader and more efficient agreeme...
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Furthermore, in order to find a common ground for negotiations with Iran, the U.S. should declare that it will not unilaterally withdraw from the nuclear deal again. In that context, while it is appar...
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needs to make it clear whether Iran, breaching its obligations under the deal, reached sufficient level of enriched uranium to produce nuclear weapon and whether it could deploy nuclear weapons on bal...
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Ethics Committee Certificate Of Ethics Committee approval was not required. Approval Scale Permission Scale permission is not required. References Albright, D. & Stricker, A. (2015). lran’s Nuclear...
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Kirklareli Universitesi iktisadi ve idari Bilimler Fakiiltesi Dergisi ISSN: 2146-3417 | E-ISSN: 2587-2052 Cilt 12, Say! 02, Eylul 2023 292 293 KAYA; United States-Iran Relations: The Trump Impact, ...
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8 Iran Missile Attack in Iraq, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-security-usa-casualties-idUSKBN1ZGOAX. Rubin, A. J., Hubbard, B., Fassihi, F. & Erlanger, S. (2020). Iran Ends Nuclear Limits as ...
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Kirklareli University Journal of the Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences ISSN: 2146-3417 | E-ISSN: 2587-2052 Volume 12, Issue 02, September 2023