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15208_pdf.pdf

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Title: Rivalry and Rifts in the Arab Gulf: The Complex Dynamics of Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Qatar
Description: Explore the intricate geopolitical landscape of the Arab Gulf involving Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar. Unravel the deep-seated rivalries and ideological clashes that have shaped the power dynamics in the region, from economic competitiveness to the role of political Islam. Delve into the historical relationships, conflicting foreign policies, and the enduring impact of events like the Qatar blockade and the normalization of ties between UAE and Israel.
Tags: Arab Gulf Saudi Arabia UAE Qatar geopolitics political Islam GCC crisis Middle East rivalry blockade regional autonomy foreign policy ideological clash security dilemma
Status: finished
Pages: 20
Uploaded: 2026-03-02 09:34
Last Processed: 2026-03-02 10:39

Chunks (39)

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Electronic Journal of Social and Strategic Studies Volume 5 Issue 1 Date of publication: 31 May 2024 Apr-May 2024 DOI: https://doi.org/10.47362/EJSSS.2024.5101 Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar’s Quest...
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' Afifa Iqbal has a Master’s in International Relations from Amity Institute of International Studies (AIIS), Amity University, NOIDA Electronic Journal of Social and Strategic Studies Volume 5 Issue ...
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At this juncture, the Gulf’s threat perception of Iran evidently triumphed over the concerns of a potential hegemony of Saudi Arabia within the organization (Buzan, 2019; Ehteshami, 2011). However, in...
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However, these embraces fail to overshadow the changing realities driven by the competing foreign policy priorities of the Gulf countries (Jacobs, 2023). The failure to bridge the persistent gaps is e...
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Appearing as a threat to Saudi Arabia’s ambitions and dominance in the region, the competition over potential leadership status has been the key driver of the UAE’s assertive and independent foreign ...
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For instance, in Yemen, this partnership dramatically transformed into a competitive quest for influence as the UAE attacked Yemeni governmental forces to back its southern separatist allies. Starting...
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Apparently, the UAE’s strategic ambitions in Yemen were not the restoration of the Hadi government but to have control over Yemen’s vital strategic maritime locations, such as the building of a milita...
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However, forging strong economic ties with the US and being a major importer of US weaponry, US-UAE ties remain on a strong footing (Dunne, 2023). Moreover, Saudi Arabia’s reluctance to renounce its d...
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In 2009, the UAE registered its objections to the proposition of locating the GCC central bank headquarters in Riyadh. In 2021, the UAE energy ministry deemed the Saudi-led plan within OPEC + to exten...
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UAE rebuffs plan by OPEC, Saudi Arabia to extend production pact (2021). Al Jazeera, https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2021/7/4/uae-rebuffs-plan-by-opec-allies-to-extend-production- pact Electronic Jo...
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These factors could range from political leadership to the forging of alliances or reliance on other states for aid to enhance their own relative power capabilities. Aiming to maximize its influence a...
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Before Sheikh Hamad took the reins of power in Qatar, a few incidents shaped his outlook against Saudi domination. The 1992 Saudi-Qatar border clash culminated in the deaths of two Qatari soldiers (F...
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date back to 1992, which further led to the formalization and expansion of Washington’s military presence in the region, such as in the Sayliyah logistical depot or the Al Ubeid air base, which remain...
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Electronic Journal of Social and Strategic Studies Volume 5 Issue 1 Date of publication: 31 May 2024 Apr-May 2024 DOI: https://doi.org/10.47362/EJSSS.2024.5101 2011 onwards to working along with its ...
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In 2014, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain withdrew their ambassadors in protest at new Qatari emir Tamim bin Hamad AI Thani’s status -quo challenging foreign policy approach. In response to this, Qa...
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The diplomatic suspension of ties was followed by the imposition of land and maritime trade sanctions on Qatar. Not all the GCC states backed the blockade. Oman allowed Qatar to use its ports, and Kuw...
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Tillerson’s efforts pressured Mohammed bin Salman to back down, as this invasion could potentially harm the long-term Saudi-U'S. relationship. However, the turn of events ultimately enraged the UAE cr...
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The four main Arab states of ‘the quartet’ reconciled their ties with Doha to different degrees throughout the post al Ula summit, with Saudi Arabia and Egypt spearheading the reconciliation process (...
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The regional order in the Gulf is part of a broader regional system of the Middle East, consisting of a number of cluster factors such as power dynamics, ideational factors, and domestic aspects. In t...
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These four camps include the conservative-moderates (the Anti-Muslim Brotherhood; the KSA and the UAE), the conservative-resistance (case- dependent; Iran-led), the moderate-resistance (pro-Muslim Bro...
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Abu Dhabi’s adherence to an authoritarian ruling model and its staunch opposition to the Muslim Brotherhood have been the key motivators of its threat perception towards Qatari foreign policy. The ali...
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In this context, Qatar backed the revolutionary uprisings in the hope that MB would assume governmental positions, 3 Read... Telci, i.N., & Oztiirk Horoz, T. (2021). Competing Policies towards the M...
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Here, Mohammed bin Zayed’s vision of secular and centralized states being at odds with Qatar’s support for the Islamists thus became the core of the Gulf rift (Davidson, 2019). In 2013, Abu Dhabi stro...
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Hence, Riyadh was the main agent of the al-Ula summit that culminated in lifting up the Qatari blockade (Cafiero, 2022). 6. Impact of External Forces in the Gulf Region The Red Sea, Arabian Peninsul...
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This external military presence in the Gulf is intricately linked to the sale of military equipment in the region, particularly by the United States, the United Kingdom, and France. Reportedly, betwee...
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Since the 2017— 2021 blockade, Qatar has extensively engaged in diplomatic maneuvers to safeguard its interests in a neighborhood wallowed in a combative power rivalry. This includes moderating high-l...
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Electronic Journal of Social and Strategic Studies Volume 5 Issue 1 Date of publication: 31 May 2024 Apr-May 2024 DOI: https://doi.org/10.47362/EJSSS.2024.5101 came to help alleviate Qatar’s physical...
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In an effort to dial down rising tensions amid regional adversaries, the Gulf Cooperation Council’s historic al-Ula Summit held in 2021 marked a remarkable shift towards greater pragmatism in the UAE...
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Qatar’s engagement with a bunch of international actors is aimed at creating its image as an independent actor. This aids in forging Doha’s reputation as an innovative and engaging international Gulf ...
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There is no denying the fact that the GCC is facing a complex set of internal obstacles, namely that the two Gulf heavyweights are at odds with each other on various issues. This geostrategic rivalry ...
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(2015). Arap Bahar Sonrasi Katar Dis Politikasi ve K6rfez Siyaseti. SETA Analysis, No.138. Al-Ebraheem, H. A. (2016). Kuwait: A small state model. Kuwait and the Gulf, 88—100. doi:10.4324/978 13 15629...
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Ideational factors in Turkey’s alignment with Qatar and their impact on regional security. The International Spectator, 56(4), 101-118. doi:10.1080/03932729.2021.1994181 Bianco, C. (2020). The GCC mo...
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Huge role of the Tiny Kingdom of Qatar in Libya draws concern - WSJ. Retrieved from https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB 1000 1424052970204002304576627000922764650 Davidson, C.M. (2019). The UAE, Qatar, a...
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Retrieved from https://foreignpolicy.com/2014/09/30/the-case-against-qatar/ Dunne, C. W. (2023). The UAE-Saudi Arabia rivalry becomes a rift. Retrieved from https://arabcenterdc .org/resource/the-uae...
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External behavior of Small States in light of theories of international relations. Retrieved from https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/REPS-11-2018- 0028/full/html Hanieh, A. (2017). T...
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Electronic Journal of Social and Strategic Studies Volume 5 Issue 1 Date of publication: 31 May 2024 Apr-May 2024 DOI: https://doi.org/10.47362/EJSSS.2024.5101 Rex Tillerson stopped Saudi and UAE fro...
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B. (2017). Qatar: Securing the global ambitions of a city-state. London: Hurst & Company. Roberts, D. B. (2019). Reflecting on Qatar’s “islamist” soft power. Retrieved from https://kclpure.kcl.ac .uk/...
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The Muslim Brotherhood Evolution of an Islamist Movement. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Warren, D. H. (2014). The ‘ulama’ and the Arab Uprisings 2011-13: Considering Yusuf al- Qaradawi, the ‘...
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The ‘ulama’ and the Arab Uprisings 2011-13: Considering Yusuf al- Qaradawi, the ‘Global Mufti,’ between the Muslim Brotherhood, the Islamic legal tradition, and Qatari foreign policy. New Middle Easte...